

Message Text

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TO USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE

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FOR CARTER -- SECRETARY'S PARTY--FROM PA

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: SOPN, OVIP (VANCE)

SUBJECT: PRESS MATERIAL

1. HEREWITH FULL TEXT KENNETH BACON OP-ED COLUMN WALL
STREET JOURNAL TUESDAY MAY 17 HEADED "SHOWDOWN OVER SALT."

2. DURING THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN, JIMMY CARTER
CRITICIZED HENRY KISSINGER FOR "GIVING UP TOO MUCH AND
ASKING TOO LITTLE" WHILE NEGOTIATING ARMS-CONTROL AGREE-
MENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

3. "I AM NOT AFRAID OF HARD BARGAINING WITH THE SOVIET
UNION," CANDIDATE CARTER SAID, SUGGESTING THAT FORMER
SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER WAS TOO SOFT, TOO READY TO
CAVE IN TO SOVIET DEMANDS IN ORDER TO WIN POLITICALLY
EXPEDIENT STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 112878

4. NOW MR. KISSINGER IS ON THE FAT-FEE LECTURE AND TV
CIRCUIT, AND MR. CARTER HAS A CHANCE TO SHOW HIS STUFF.
WILL PRESIDENT CARTER LIVE UP TO CANDIDATE CARTER'S TOUGH
TALK?

5. SO FAR, THE ANSWER SEEMS TO BE YES. BUT THE FINAL

ANSWER WON'T BE KNOWN FOR SOME TIME. STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS HAVE BEEN STALLED SINCE MARCH, WHEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION REJECTED EACH OTHER'S SALT PROPOSALS. IF THE DEADLOCK CONTINUES, DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL PRESSURES WILL GROW--EITHER TO MAKE CONCESSIONS IN ORDER TO REACH A NEW SALT PACT TO REPLACE THE 1972 AGREEMENT THAT EXPIRES OCT 3, OR TO STEP UP WORK ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS TO SHOW THE SOVIETS THEY WILL FACE A STRONGER U.S. FORCE UNLESS THEY AGREE TO NEW CONTROLS.

6. NEITHER COURSE IS ATTRACTIVE. MAJOR CONCESSIONS, AT A TIME WHEN THERE'S ALREADY RISING CONCERN IN CONGRESS ABOUT THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP, COULD GIVE MR. CARTER THE REPUTATION OF PURSUING A TALK-TOUGH-BUT-LITTLE-STICK FOREIGN POLICY, PERHAPS JEOPARDIZING THE CHANCE THAT HIS SALT TREATY COULD WIN RATIFICATION. THE ALTERNATIVE, STEPPED-UP ARMS SPENDING, WOULD RUN COUNTER TO MR. CARTER'S PRIMARY DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN GOALS--A BALANCED BUDGET FOR THE FISCAL YEAR STARTING OCT 1, 1980, AND A SHARP SLOW-DOWN IN THE ARMS RACE.

7. STEPPED-UP DEVELOPMENT, THE COURSE FAVORED BY THE U.S. MILITARY, COULD ALSO LEAD TO TENSIONS WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION. "THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO EMULATE THAN CAPITULATE," SAYS CHIEF SALT NEGOTIATOR PAUL WARNKE. "CAN WE BLACKMAIL THEM INTO AN AGREEMENT? MY ANSWER WOULD BE NO."

8. INDICATIONS OF HOW MR. CARTER WILL DEAL WITH THESE
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PAGE 03 STATE 112878

OPTIONS MAY COME SOON. THIS WEEK SECRETARY OF STATE CYRUS VANCE AND SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI GROMYKO WILL MEET IN GENEVA TO DISCUSS ARMS CONTROL. THE OUTLOOK ISN'T BRIGHT. "NOBODY HAS MOVED FROM HIS POSITION AT THIS POINT," MR. VANCE SAYS, AND THE U.S. DOESN'T PLAN TO TAKE A NEW PROPOSAL TO GENEVA.

9. "WE SHOULDN'T FEEL CALLED UPON TO COME UP WITH A NEW PROPOSAL EVERY TIME THE SOVIETS SAY THEY DON'T LIKE THE ONES THEY'VE HEARD SO FAR," DEFENSE SECRETARY HAROLD BROWN NOTES. ADDS MR. WARNKE: "THE BEST WE CAN HOPE FOR IS TO SET A NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK" AT GENEVA FOR FUTURE TALKS.

10. IT'S POSSIBLE, OF COURSE, THAT THE SOVIETS WILL TAKE A NEW PROPOSAL TO GENEVA, OR THAT THEY WILL BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE DETAILS OF EITHER OF THE TWO U.S. PROPOSALS THEY REJECTED IN MARCH. BUT THE SOVIETS AREN'T

KNOWN FOR SURPRISING CONCESSIONS. "THEY'RE OVERLY

REPETITIVE, OVERLY ARGUMENTATIVE AND OVERLY SECRETIVE,"
SAYS AN EXPERIENCED ARMS-CONTROL NEGOTIATOR.

11. IT IS MORE LIKELY THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL CONTINUE
TO WAIT FOR SOME CHANGE BY THE U.S. WAITING HAS PAID
OFF BEFORE, BY PROMPTING U.S. CONCESSIONS IN PREVIOUS
SALT NEGOTIATIONS. FURTHERMORE, MR. CARTER HAS ALREADY
REVERSED OR MODIFIED HIS POSITION ON SOME CONTROVERSIAL
DOMESTIC ISSUES-- THE 50 DOLLARS TAX REBATE, HIS "HIT
LIST" OF FEDERAL WATER PROJECTS AND HIS INITIAL PLAN
FOR LOW FARM-PRICE SUPPORTS--AND THE SOVIETS MAY EXPECT
A COMPARABLE SOFTENING ON SALT IF THEY HOLD OUT LONG
ENOUGH.

12. AFTER THE SOVIETS REJECTED THE U.S. SALT PROPOSALS
IN MARCH, MR. CARTER VOWED TO "HANG TOUGH" AND ADDED THIS
THREAT: IF, FOLLOWING THE GENEVA MEETING, THE U.S.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 STATE 112878

DECIDES THAT "THE SOVIETS AREN'T ACTING IN GOOD FAITH
WITH US AND THAT AN AGREEMENT IS UNLIKELY, THEN I WOULD
BE FORCED TO CONSIDER A MUCH MORE DEEP COMMITMENT TO THE
DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL WEAPONS."

13. IF THERE'S NO PROGRESS AT GENEVA, THE FIRST DECISION
MR. CARTER COULD MAKE TO SHOW RESOLVE WOULD BE TO GO AHEAD
WITH DEVELOPMENT OF THE B1 BOMBER, THE PLANE DESIGNED TO
PENETRATE SOVIET AIR DEFENSES THROUGH THE END OF THE
CENTURY. UNDER TERMS OF A CONTRACT BETWEEN THE AIR FORCE
AND ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORP., THE PLANE'S PRIME CON-
TRACTOR, THE ADMINISTRATION MUST DECIDE BY JUNE WHETHER
TO PROCEED WITH THE 24.8 BILLION DOLLARS PROGRAM.

14. DURING THE CAMPAIGN, MR. CARTER CALLED THE B1 BOMBER
"AN EXAMPLE OF A PROPOSED SYSTEM WHICH SHOULD NOT BE
FUNDED AND WOULD BE WASTEFUL OF THE TAXPAYERS' DOLLARS."
BUT SINCE THEN IT HAS BECOME CLEAR THAT THE DECISION
WON'T REST ON ECONOMY ALONE; THE B1 HAS BECOME A BARGAINING
CHIP.

15. MR. CARTER SAYS HIS DECISION WILL REST PARTLY ON
"THE ATTITUDE OF THE SOVIET UNION." HE EXPLAINS: "IF
WE CAN HAVE A GENERAL LESSENING OF TENSION, A DEMONSTRATED
COMMITMENT ON THEIR PART TOWARD DISARMAMENT, IT WOULD
CERTAINLY MAKE IT LESS LIKELY THAT WE WOULD GO AHEAD WITH
THE B1." DEFENSE SECRETARY BROWN HAS DELAYED UNTIL AFTER
THE GENEVA MEETING HIS RECOMMENDATION ON WHETHER TO PRO-
CEED WITH THE B1. THE PLANE'S FUTURE "IS JUST ABOUT THE

ONLY STRATEGIC DECISION THAT HASN'T BEEN MADE THAT CAN

AFFECT THE STRATEGIC BALANCE IN THE EARLY 1980S," A
PENTAGON OFFICIAL SAYS.

16. THERE IS A HOST OF OTHER STRATEGIC DECISIONS THAT
MR. CARTER COULD MAKE IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS. THEY
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 05 STATE 112878

INCLUDE ONES INVOLVING THE PACE OF A PROGRAM TO BUILD
A NEW INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE, THE DEVELOP-
MENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE LOW-FLYING AND HIGHLY
ACCURATE CRUISE MISSILE AND IMPROVEMENT IN THE NATION'S
AIR DEFENSE. "WE ARE SPENDING ABOUT 1.0 PER CENT OF OUR
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT ON STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES,"
SAYS SECRETARY BROWN, AND HIGHER OUTLAYS COULD OCCUR
WITHOUT UNDUE STRAIN.

17. IF THE SOVIETS "CONTINUE TO INCREASE THE SIZE AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF THEIR STRATEGIC FORCES," ADDS MR. BROWN,
"THIS COUNTRY BEYOND QUESTION WILL RESPOND TO ENSURE
THAT OUR FORCES CONTINUE TO PROVIDE A DETERRENCE THAT IS
CREDIBLE, IS STABLE AND PRODUCES PERCEIVED EQUIVALENCE"
WITH SOVIET FORCES. "THE PREFERRED PATH, OF COURSE,
WOULD BE FOR BOTH SIDES TO REDUCE IN NUMBER THEIR
STRATEGIC WEAPONS AND THEN TO SLOW DOWN TECHNOLOGICAL
IMPROVEMENTS WHICH COULD LEAD TO ONE SIDE'S ACQUIRING
AN ADVANTAGE," HE ADDS.

18. THIS IS WHAT THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION PROPOSED TO
THE SOVIETS. AS A FALL-BACK POSITION, THE U.S. PROPOSED
A MORE MODEST PLAN WORKED OUT AT VLADIVOSTOK IN 1974
BUT NEVER ADOPTED. IT WOULD LIMIT EACH SIDE TO A TOTAL
OF 2,400 LONG-RANGE BOMBERS, INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC
MISSILES AND SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES, OF
WHICH 1,320 COULD CARRY MULTIPLE WARHEADS. THE U.S.
HAS ABOUT 2,130 STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES, NEARLY
SOVIETS HAVE ABOUT 2,540 STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES,
LESS THAN 300 OF WHICH HAVE MULTIPLE WARHEADS.

19. THE SOVIETS WANT THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT TO SERVE
AS THE BASIS OF A SALT ACCORD, ALONG WITH A LIMIT ON THE
U.S. CRUISE MISSILE, WHICH IS DESIGNED TO FLY UNDER
SOVIET AIR DEFENSES. THE BROADER U.S. PLAN PROPOSES
LIMITS ON THE CRUISE MISSILE BUT THE RUSSIANS DON'T THINK
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 06 STATE 112878

THESE LIMITS ARE SUFFICIENT.

20. "I DON'T THINK THERE'S ANY REASON TO OVERREACT TO THE FACT THAT WE HAVEN'T IN THE FIRST FOUR MONTHS OF THIS

ADMINISTRATION ARRIVED AT A TREATY WITH THE SOVIETS ON STRATEGIC ARMS," SECRETARY BROWN SAYS. WHILE HE DOESN'T BELIEVE IT'S POSSIBLE TO NEGOTIATE AN AGREEMENT BY OCTOBER THAT CALLS FOR SHARP FORCE REDUCTIONS AND LIMITS ON TECHNOLOGY ENVISIONED IN THE COMPREHENSIVE U.S. PROPOSAL, "THERE'S A PRETTY GOOD CHANCE THAT THERE WILL BE SOME SORT OF AGREEMENT BY THEN OF A MODEST KIND." MR. WARNKE SUGGESTS THE POSSIBILITY OF AN AGREEMENT BASED ON THE VLADIVOSTOK ACCORD.

21. A MODEST AGREEMENT WOULDN'T ELIMINATE THE NEED FOR A DIFFICULT CHOICE BETWEEN FUTURE NEGOTIATING CONCESSIONS AND STEPPED-UP ARMS SPENDING, ALTHOUGH THE CHOICE MIGHT BECOME POLITICALLY LESS URGENT. THE U.S. WILL INSIST THAT A MODEST ACCORD MUST CONTAIN A COMMITMENT TO WORK TOWARD A SUBSTANTIAL FORCE REDUCTION AND A FREEZE ON THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW LAND-BASED MISSILES. IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS MR. CARTER CONTINUALLY WILL HAVE TO WEIGH THE IMPACT OF U.S. PLANS TO STRENGTHEN ITS STRATEGIC FORCES. RESTRAINING WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT OFFERS A LIMIT ON COSTS AND SHOWS A FAITH IN ARMS CONTROL. BUT IF THE SOVIETS FIND THEY CAN OBTAIN SUCH RESTRAINTS WITHOUT A STRICT NEW AGREEMENT, THERE WILL BE LITTLE INCENTIVE FOR THEM TO AGREE TO STRICTER CONTROLS. CHRISTOPHER

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